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The Moral Limits of the Crime of Money 
Laundering 
Peter Alldridge* 
I.  THE PROBLEMATIC 
Clean money is worth more than dirty money.  Clean 
money—money untainted by criminal association—can be 
invested in profitable activities or spent on consumption, 
more or less conspicuous, without risk of recrimination.  
Dirty money, generally speaking, can only be invested or 
spent less profitably, less visibly, and at a risk of 
punishment.  It also carries the risk of being used as 
evidence of the initial crime.  With the exceptions of small 
thefts of fungibles, like cash and the fantasy case of the 
criminal art collector who wishes to sit alone with a 
painting so famous that it could not be resold, virtually all 
income from criminal activities must be disguised to be of 
use to the criminal.  Money laundering1 is that process of 
disguise. Analysis of money laundering, in terms of 
criminal markets, holds that secrecy has value.2  People 
will pay for secrecy because it costs less than disclosure.  To 
the person in possession of money deriving from illegal 
sources, the dangers of disclosure relate to the possibility of 
prosecution and imprisonment.  The process of money 
laundering holds out the prospect of gaining lasting secrecy 
for the information dealing with the provenance of the 
money.  On the demand side, a person holding assets 
 
 *  Reader in Law, Cardiff Law School, Wales, U.K. 
 1. Jack A. Blum et al., Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money-
Laundering 6 (UNDCP Technical Ser. No. 8, 1998).  The origin of the term is in 
the use of cash based retail service industries like laundries to disguise the 
origins of cash acquired through rackets in the United States.  The object was to 
mix legally and illegally obtained cash to avoid the attention of corrupt police 
officers, competitors, and (from the time that prosecution for tax evasion came to 
be a potent weapon in the hands of authorities unable to bring successful 
prosecutions for specific substantive offenses) the tax authorities. 
 2. Ingo Walter, The Economics of International Money Laundering (1991). 
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acquired from illegal sources should be willing to expose 
him/herself to a reduced rate of return or a higher rate of 
risk (exchange rates, etc.) or both.  Rational launders may 
prefer conservative portfolios.  One conservative choice is to 
expatriate the money.  On the supply side, if the channels 
of conventional inter-bank fund transfers are closed due to 
exchange controls, or appear unattractive due to the risk of 
disclosure, then alternatives will be sought. 
In many ways, notwithstanding the very low 
conviction rate and low rates of monies recovered in the 
United Kingdom, money laundering was the “crime of the 
1990s.”3 It will remain high on the law enforcement agenda 
during the years that follow.  It has moved quickly from 
being marginal in the early 1980s—not even a ground for 
confiscation, let alone a crime—to a position at the center 
of efforts at co-operation in the “war on drugs”4 and the 
“struggle against organized crime” and now “the war on 
terrorism.”  Growth in the interest in money laundering 
has coincided with globalization, characterized by 
increased deregulation, financial liberalization,5 and 
privatization.  Globalization created reasons no longer to 
control international capital movements.  Laundering 
creates new reasons to monitor them. 
These developments have not occurred in a vacuum.  
As late as 1980, the ability to set criminal law was still one 
of the most significant attributes of the nation-state.  
Twenty years later that has changed.  The development of 
the international response to money laundering has been 
one of the principal factors in this radical shift.  
Developments in co-operation against drugs and organized 
crime under the third pillar of the Treaty of European 
Union have focused around the area.  Late in 1999, the 
 
 3. G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering: The Crime of the ‘90’s, 27 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 149 (1989). 
 4. The metaphor of war is a telling one.  It is impossible to undertake a war 
without being prepared to commit vast resources and without a danger of 
indifference to the means by which progress is secured. 
 5. Capital movements throughout the European Union were fully liberalized 
as of July 1, 1990.  Council Directive 88/361, art. 67, 1988 O.J. (L 178) 5 (Capital 
Movements Directive). 
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Tampere European Council meeting6 placed enormous 
emphasis upon money laundering, calling, in particular, for 
an increase in consistency in the definition of predicate 
offenses, the adoption of the revised directive,7 and the 
greater availability of all relevant information for the 
purposes of exchange, irrespective of arguments from 
banking secrecy. 
The process of demonization of the money launderer 
has directed attention away from any close consideration of 
the arguments for powers of confiscation and forfeiture of 
the proceeds of crime and for the criminalization of 
laundering.  They will vary according to which enforcement 
power is in point and must be considered independently of 
one another.  The fact that a case can be constructed for 
one of the three measures does not imply that it applies 
equally for the existence of a different power.  Each power, 
if it should remain, requires an independent and sufficient 
justification.  In particular, criminalization requires a 
justification discrete from those that will support 
confiscation.8  Criminalization of laundering an asset is not 
justified simply because the asset is liable to confiscation. 
One of the great achievements of Feinberg’s Moral 
Limits of the Criminal Law is the force with which, and 
depth to which, arguments were pursued, sometimes 
leading to uncomfortable conclusions about the proper 
scope of the criminal law.  Since its publication,9 money 
 
 6. The conclusions of the Tampere Special European Council are available at 
www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99. See Julian Schutte, Tampere 
European Council (15 & 16 October 1999): Presidency Conclusions, 70 Revue 
Internationale de Droit Penal 1023, 1034-35 (1999). 
 7. See Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending 
Council Directive 1991/308 EEC of June 10, 1991 on prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering under discussion at time of 
writing.  The 1991 Money Laundering Directive forms the basis of the law in the 
European Union. 
 8. As to the general question of the justifiability of forfeiture provisions, see 
Leonard W. Levy, A License to Steal: The Forfeiture of Property (1996); see also 
Guy Stessens, Money Laundering; A New International Law Enforcement Model 
(2000). 
 9. For the author’s initial reactions, see Peter Alldridge, 1985 Crim. L. Rev. 
411 (reviewing Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (1983)); Peter Alldridge, 1986 
Crim. L. Rev. 420 (reviewing Joel Feinberg, Offense to Others (1984)). 
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laundering has leapt up the criminal justice agenda to the 
point where no international discussion of criminal justice 
seems to be able to avoid the topic.  The body of law 
surrounding laundering, however, has developed without 
the sort of transparent, principled public analysis, which 
would have been essential to the provision of a rational 
criminal law.  But there are now some clear statements by 
the bodies responsible for the crusade against money 
laundering, particularly the Financial Action Task Force 
and the International Monetary Fund, as to what precisely 
the harm is that they seek to prevent.  Money laundering is 
the most significant new serious crime to appear on statute 
books worldwide since the publication of Moral Limits.10  
The purpose of this essay is to take the arguments for its 
existence seriously.  The law of England and Wales will be 
used as the illustration, but this is an area in which most 
jurisdictions’ laws are formulated in order to comply with 
international instruments. And while enforcement 
strategies vary, the actual prohibitions are usually similar.  
In particular, the shape of the prohibitions in English Law 
follows directly from the Vienna Convention and the E.U. 
directive. 
II. THEORY: JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FORFEITURE AND 
CONFISCATION 
There is a range of weapons that can be used against 
the financial gains of crime.  Profits might be seized in rem 
or in specie, with or even without a conviction for the 
predicate offense.  They might even be taxed.  Powers of 
confiscation are relatively easy to justify, and powers of 
forfeiture have been the subject of a good deal of recent 
consideration.  This essay will consider the range of 
possible justifications for the criminal offenses of money 
laundering.  The first section deals with the question 
whether, and under what circumstances within the “harm” 
 
 10. I exclude “cybercrimes” which are largely new ways of committing old 
crimes. 
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framework, it is morally legitimate to criminalize money 
laundering at all, and if it is, what might properly be 
regarded as mitigating and aggravating factors, and hence 
might provide criteria by reference to which rational 
consistent sentencing may take place.  The second section 
deals with a set of arguments about the economic harm 
which laundering is said to do, and their relationship to the 
existence and enforcement of criminal offenses.  The 
purpose is to suggest that the crimes of laundering are 
unjustifiable and unnecessary. 
a.  Justifying Confiscation 
Under English law, there is no “relation back” 
doctrine. The mere fact that property was acquired through 
the illegal conduct of a trade did not of itself generate a 
right to confiscate.11  Limited claims were made during the 
twentieth century to argue that all profits of crime were 
held on constructive trust for the Crown, or that there was 
a duty to account for them.12  In the absence of a 
contractual, fiduciary, or other duty, there is no power to 
deprive a person of the “literary proceeds” of crime.  There 
is no general right for the victims of crime to seek redress 
against the proceeds of the sales of books describing the 
offenses, and there is no right in the State to seize them.13  
Nor in English law is there a common law power for the 
State to seize the proceeds of crime,14 but statutory powers 
have been put in place to accompany a sentence with a 
confiscation order.  There are concomitant enforcement 
powers and reporting obligations. 
Confiscation, the appropriation by the state of money 
 
 11. See Gordon v. Chief Comm’r of Metro Police [1910] 2 K.B. 1080 (Eng. C.A.) 
[England, Court of Appeal] (holding income from illegal betting nonetheless 
belonged to the bookmaker). 
 12. See Reading v. Attorney-General [1951] A.C. 507 (H.L.) [United Kingdom, 
Appeal Cases, House of Lords]. 
 13. Attorney General v. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268. 
 14. Attorney-General v. De Keyser’s Royal Hotel, [1920] A.C. 508 (H.L.); 
Burmah Oil v. Lord Advocate, [1965] A.C. 75; The Queen v. Cuthbertson, [1981] 
A.C. 470; Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268. 
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and goods equivalent at least15 to the profit made by the 
crime, is said to be justified by a “principle” that people, in 
general, should not profit from unlawful activity and from 
crime in particular is frequently said to be deeply ingrained 
into the law.16  It follows from the requirement that, if law 
is to impact upon people’s behavior, it should deliver 
coherent messages.  It is not coherent, on the one hand, to 
try to create disincentives to a particular form of behavior, 
but, on the other, to permit someone who does it to benefit.  
Expressed in utilitarian terms, the message delivered by 
the establishment of disincentives to particular forms of 
behavior should not be qualified by allowing the courts to 
be used in order to secure profits from that behavior. 
b. Justifying Forfeiture17 
Forfeiture provisions seize the impedimenta or 
instrumentalities of crime.  The principle against allowing 
people to profit from crime cannot itself supply a reason to 
allow forfeiture.  The ancient fiction, “about as irrational 
and unjust a proposition as a sober mind can concoct,”18 is 
that there is something criminal about the thing.19  Because 
the thing is guilty, the State can seize it and arguments 
from double jeopardy can be sidestepped.There are several 
objections that can be made to forfeiture provisions, 
consequent upon conviction.  First, the impact of forfeiture 
 
 15. The system in England and Wales confiscates proceeds, which is a 
category defined more widely than “profits.”  English law does not allow a 
deduction for expenses, such as the purchase of a “stock” of drugs, incurred in the 
commission of a crime. 
 16. See Robert Goff & Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution, ch. 37 (4th ed. 
1993); see also Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977); Riggs v. Palmer 
115 N.Y. 506 (1889). 
 17. For excellent general critiques of forfeiture, see David J. Fried, Criminal 
Law: Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. Crim. L.  & Criminology 328 (1988); 
Leonard William Levy, A License to Steal: The Forfeiture of Property (1996). 
 18. Jacob Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on 
Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 
46 Temp. L.Q. 169, 257 (1973). 
 19. Paul Schiff Berman, An Anthropological Approach to Modern Forfeiture 
Law: The Symbolic Function of Legal Actions Against Objects, 11 Yale J.L. & 
Human. 1 (1999). 
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falls unfairly upon the family of the person against whom 
the proceedings are brought.20  Second, forfeiture is 
arbitrary since it does not link the value of the goods seized 
to the value of the property acquired by the crime 
committed. Third, there is the question of the relationship 
between forfeiture provisions and third party rights. The 
fiction underpinning forfeiture—that the thing is guilty—
implied that the forfeiture provision should prevail over 
third party rights in the item forfeited.  This is the 
consequence arrived at in Bennis v. Michigan.21  Indeed, if 
the “symbolism” argument for forfeiture22 is adopted, it 
ought not matter whether or not the item is stolen or not.  
Fourth, leaving aside the exception cases where possession 
of the item is itself criminal or the item can only have a 
criminal use, the State has no right to seize property 
simply because it is used in the commission of crime.  This 
is an objection principle, but also an objection speaking to 
questions of human rights, and, in particular, the right to 
quiet enjoyment of property.  Fifth, a most obvious 
objection both to forfeiture and to confiscation is that they 
can generate double punishments for the same offense.  
The fiction that the thing is guilty is only a fiction.23 Even if 
the general acceptability of forfeiture is granted, some 
response must be provided to the double jeopardy 
argument, which states that a person should not be 
punished twice for the same offense.24 
All the objections, which apply to forfeiture upon 
conviction, apply a fortiori to forfeiture without a criminal 
conviction.  In addition, the principal objection to forfeiture 
 
 20. See Sandra Guerra, Family Values?: The Family as an Innocent Victim of 
Civil Drug Asset Forfeiture,  81 Cornell L.  Rev.  343 (1996). 
 21. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996). 
 22. See Berman, supra note 19. 
 23. “Goods, as goods, cannot offend, forfeit, unlade, pay duties, or the like, but 
men whose goods they are.”  Sheppard v. Gosnold, (1671) Vaughan, 159, 172. 
 24. See generally Martin L. Friedland, Double Jeopardy (1969); George C. 
Thomas, Double Jeopardy: The History, The Law (1998).  Formal double jeopardy 
protection under English law is slight, and the United Kingdom still has to accede 
to the double jeopardy protocol  (Protocol 7 Article 4) to the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 
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provisions operating in the absence of a criminal conviction 
is that “it can too easily be used as a way of penalizing 
conduct without the safeguards of the ordinary criminal 
process.”25  On all of the grounds above, it is suggested that 
any use of forfeiture beyond the cases where the item in 
question is itself contraband is unjustified. 
III.  MORAL JUSTIFICATIONS OF CRIMINALIZATION 
The international movement toward putting in place 
crimes of laundering centers upon the Vienna Convention.26  
Article Three obliges signatory nations to criminalize a list 
of activities to do with drug trafficking.  It also obliges 
them to criminalize intentional money laundering in 
relation to various offenses of drug trafficking, and to take 
steps to ensure that bank secrecy does not impede 
enforcement, particularly cross-border enforcement.  
Subsequent international initiatives have extended the 
scope of money laundering law beyond those which have 
drugs offenses as predicates to those whose is other crime—
perhaps serious or organized, but in principle any crime 
generating profit.  The laundering legislation in England 
and Wales puts in place two parallel sets of crimes,27 which 
are in the process of being merged.28 The drug money 
laundering offenses preceded the offenses whose predicate 
offenses were not related to drugs, and remain, to some 
extent at least, the more draconian of the two.  Those 
offenses bring the jurisdiction into compliance with the 
Vienna Convention and subsequent international 
 
 25. Derek Hodgson, Profits of Crime and their Recovery, 97 (1984).  The 
Hodgson Report was written after The Queen v Cuthbertson [1981] A.C. 470, 
which held that there was no power to forfeit the proceeds of drug dealing.  It was 
the progenitor of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act, 1986, c. 32 (Eng.), the first 
confiscation legislation in England and Wales. 
 26. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc E/CONF. 82/15, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 
(1989) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 27. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 93A (Eng.), Drug Trafficking Act, 1994, 
c. 37, § 49 (Eng.). 
 28. The Proceeds of Crime Bill is at the time of writing (December 2001) 
moving through its Parliamentary stages. 
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agreements. 
The assertion of a general principle that a person 
should not be permitted to benefit from crime (or even the 
application of that principle far more rigorously than is 
currently done in English law) does not necessarily justify 
the criminalization of dealing with the proceeds.  Indeed, if 
the confiscation provisions were to operate ideally, and no 
profits actually were to be made from the predicate offenses 
to which the laundering provisions applied, then the 
independent argument for criminalization would be 
considerably weakened. The arguments for criminalization 
require some disentangling.  But, broadly speaking, it is 
possible to distinguish between, on the one hand, the sorts 
of moral arguments which are the usual means by which 
the limits of the most serious criminal offenses are set 
(identifying a harm against which it is appropriate for the 
law to militate, identifying a guilty mental state and then, 
perhaps, sets of aggravating and mitigating 
characteristics), and, on the other, the set of economic 
arguments why laundering should be considered an issue 
sufficiently serious as to justify invoking the criminal law.29  
Frequently untouched in economic analyses is the link 
between the claim that economic damage is caused and 
that criminalization should follow.  The major “moral” 
accounts of criminalization are as follows: 
(1) Punishing Laundering Removes the Incentive to 
Commit Predicate Offenses30 
This argument is a very simple one, akin to the 
assertion of the principle against allowing profit from 
crime.  There are two major sets of objections.  First, it is 
 
 29. This distinction is by no means a hard and fast one.  Deliberately to cause 
economic damage is immoral. Perhaps a more accurate way to state the 
distinction in the text might be between arguments which deal with long range 
economic harms and those which do not. 
 30. The expression “predicate offense,” taken from the Vienna Convention 
(and many subsequent international instruments), indicates the offense by which 
the profits were acquired. 
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frequently taken for granted that if laundering were to be 
more difficult, there would be substantially fewer predicate 
offenses.  This is by no means self-evident.  Even if there 
were to be perfect enforcement of laundering offenses, the 
profits to be made from drugs are such that there would 
still be ample incentive for dealers simply to hold the 
money in cash until they are ready to use it.  The U.K. 
money laundering legislation does not prevent the use of 
safe deposit boxes for cash to be spent later.  Second, but 
more importantly, the argument depends for its validity 
upon an implausible and unproven empirical claim.  If the 
predicate offense is already a crime and there exists power 
to confiscate the profits of the offense, what additional force 
do provisions have which make it a crime to dispose of the 
money? If somebody contemplating a course of conduct 
involving the unlawful acquisition of money followed by its 
laundering is not put off by the existence of the predicate 
offense nor by the existence of the power to confiscate, it is 
hardly likely that the existence of the laundering offense 
will make much difference. 
The deterrent argument would be slightly stronger if 
the chances of being detected for the predicate offense are 
significantly lower than for laundering, which will seldom 
be the case, or where the penalties for the laundering 
offense are so much higher than for the predicate offense as 
to make a difference to a rational, calculating criminal.  It 
would be difficult to justify such a sentencing regime. 
(2) Laundering is a Form of Complicity in Predicate 
Offenses 
The argument for regarding laundering as a form of 
complicity is slightly different. It is that laundering is a 
form of participation in another offense.  It is clear that 
inchoate liability in English law has extended significantly 
beyond the traditional trio, rooted in common law, of 
attempt, conspiracy, and incitement.  There is now a large 
group of statutory inchoate offenses (ranging from threat 
offenses, to going equipped for stealing, to possession of 
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firearms, explosives, or scales that give false measures).  
They have extended significantly the scope of the conduct 
covered by attempt, conspiracy, and incitement. In 
consequence of these statutes, criminal law now enjoins 
conduct that is significantly earlier in time, and further 
removed causally from the consummated offense, than an 
attempt. If laundering is a form of complicity, it also 
extends to cover conduct later in time and geographically 
removed from the crime. 
The two main objections to treating money laundering 
as a form of complicity in the predicate offense are: first, 
that it is frequently by no means clear from which 
predicate offense the objectionable part of laundering is 
derived; and, second, that as a matter of labeling, it does 
not properly encapsulate the significance of the harm.  As 
to the first, identification of the predicate offense is 
important because the usual account of complicity at 
common law holds that the degree of culpability of the 
accomplice is limited to that of the principal.31 If, for 
example, the launderer is regarded as an accomplice to 
possession of drugs, than that differs, and usually is 
treated far less seriously, from being an accomplice to 
dealing.  At the least, if this is the argument, then it needs 
to be explicated far more fully.  As to the second, the 
sentences that are set in the very few English money 
laundering cases do not express any particular concern for 
the nature of the offense by which the money was acquired.  
If the “harm” in laundering is some more remote economic 
harm done by the launderer, then it is not relevant what 
the source of the money is, and laundering is better 
regarded as the offense itself, rather than as the coda to 
another. 
 
 31. Sandford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the 
Interpretation of Doctrine 73 Cal. L. Rev. 323 (1985). 
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(3) Punishing Laundering “Gets the Real Criminals” 
 
 
Discourse about “organized crime” in general, and drug 
dealing in particular, is peppered with references to the 
idea that crime, when organized, typically operates along 
hierarchical lines. That is, at the top of all criminal 
organizations there is someone who keeps most of the 
profits, lives a very comfortable life in an exclusive quarter, 
and rules the subordinates with a rod of iron.  If this 
stereotype has any basis in reality, it is easy to see how 
people in the upper levels of an organization can distance 
themselves morally, psychologically, and geographically 
from the ugly ground level criminal activities. The 
argument, which is then made for criminalizing laundering 
is that these people cannot distance themselves from the 
profit because that is why they are in the enterprise.32  The 
really significant criminals can be identified and punished 
if the money can be traced to them. 
The extent to which there are significant numbers of 
criminals conforming to the stereotype is unclear.33 But if 
this is the justification, it has a far more wide-reaching 
impact.  It embodies a curious ambivalence towards the 
effect of legislation.  If a person fulfils this stereotype, then, 
in cases where there is adequate evidence that the money 
is linked to the predicate offenses, s/he probably will be an 
accomplice in those offenses.  Failing that, conspiracy 
charges could be brought, and liability can be established 
independently of a crime of laundering.  Where, on the 
other hand, there is no evidence that the money is linked to 
the predicate offenses, there will be no independent case for 
a crime of laundering. Where proof that the money is 
linked to the crime will depend upon shifting the burden of 
proof, criminalization—whether as accessory to or 
 
 32. See Performance and Innovation Unit, Cabinet Office, Recovering the 
Proceeds of Crime para. 1.3 (2000), at http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/ 
innovation/ 2000/crime/recovering/01.htm 
 33. See Petrus C. Van Duyne, The Emperor’s Clothes of Disclosure: Hot 
Money and Suspect Disclosures, 31 Crime L. & Soc. Change 245-71 (1999). 
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conspirator in the predicate offense or for a distinct offense 
of laundering—will depend upon the legitimacy of the 
shifted burden.34  But whether or not shifted burdens are 
acceptable, there is no independent case for 
criminalization.  What the rhetorical deployment of this 
stereotype really argues for is a category of complicity 
based upon instigation, which would be a significant (if 
long overdue) reform of the law of complicity towards which 
the English Law Commission groped.35 
There is another way of stating the “real criminal” 
argument.  Simply, if people without jobs, who do not claim 
benefit, are able to buy expensive cars and houses, and 
appear to emerge unscathed by the law, then this is an 
example to others as to how to make money that ought not 
to be given.  Members of the police claim that public 
satisfaction follows the apprehension of such people, and it 
has been endorsed at the highest level: 
[I]t simply is not right in Modern Britain that millions of 
law-abiding people work hard to earn a living, whilst a few 
live handsomely off the profits of crime. The undeserved 
trappings of success enjoyed by criminals are an affront to 
the hard-working majority. And it is, of course, often the 
underprivileged in society who suffer most from crime.36 
This is, of course, an argument for confiscation and not 
necessarily for criminalization. The “real criminals” 
argument will not provide a justification for 
criminalization. 
 
 34. Compare H.M. Advocate v. McIntosh, [2001] UKPC D1 (shifted burden in 
confiscation proceedings consistent with guarantee of presumption of innocence in 
European Convention on Human Rights because defendant subject to such 
proceedings has already been convicted), with The Queen v. Lambert, [2001} 
UKHL 37 (shifted burden in definition of criminal offense only exceptionally and 
with powerful justification acceptable). 
 35. See The Law Commission, Consultation Paper No. 131, Assisting and 
Encouraging Crime (1993). 
 36. Tony Blair, Foreword to Recovering the Proceeds of Crime, supra note 32. 
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a. Comparisons between Offenses—Sentencing Money 
Launderers 
It would have been peculiar had the objectives of the 
law and the harms which they seek to prevent—so elusive 
at the point where the crime is defined— suddenly become 
pellucid at the point of sentence.  They did not.  If there is 
to be sensible sentencing, then it must rest upon a 
developed account of what actually is wrong with money 
laundering.  Sentencers need to have some idea of what it 
is that is wrong with the offense in question so that they 
can know how the offense in question differs from the 
“standard” form that offense, what matters might amount 
to aggravating and what to mitigating factors, and so on.  
The difficulty that they faced in some of the early 
laundering cases was lack of clarity as to the governing 
rationale for the crime.  Is it like theft or fraud, or drug 
dealing, smuggling, handling stolen goods, or what?  If 
laundering is to remain a crime, then it is necessary to 
have a clearer idea of precisely what it is which is wrong in 
laundering. 
The sentencing maxima under the current English 
legislation are severe and are set out in the table on the 
following page. 
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 Criminal 
Justice 
Act 1988 
Drug 
Traffick-
ing Act 
1994 
Terror-
ism Act 
2000 
Assisting another person 
to retain the benefit 
criminal conduct or of drug 
trafficking 
14 years37 14 years38 14 years39 
Acquisition, possession, or 
use of the proceeds of 
criminal conduct or of drug 
trafficking 
14 years40 14 years41 14 years42 
Concealing or transferring 
the proceeds of criminal 
conduct or of drug 
trafficking 
14 years43 14 years44 14 years45 
Failure to disclose 
knowledge or suspicion of  
laundering 
14 years46   
Tipping-off 5 years47 5 years48  
Failing to comply with the 
requirement to operate a 
proper reporting system49 
2 years   
 
 37. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 93A(6) (Eng.). 
 38. Drug Trafficking Act, 1994, c. 37, § 54(1) (Eng.). 
 39. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 19(8) (Eng.). 
 40. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 93B(9). 
 41. Drug Trafficking Act, 1994, c. 37, § 54(1). 
 42. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 19(8). 
 43. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch. 33 § 93C(4) (Eng.). 
 44. Drug Trafficking Act, 1994, c. 37, § 54(1). 
 45. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 19(8). 
 46. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 93C(4). 
 47. Id. c. 33 § 93D(9). 
 48. Drug Trafficking Act, 1994, c. 37, § 53. 
 49. Money Laundering Regulations, (1993) req. 5(2) (Eng.). 
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The Sentencing Advisory Panel was established in 
1999 to give advice to the Court of Appeal on “standard” 
sentences, but it has yet to deal with money laundering.  
And, since there are very few prosecutions, it is unlikely to 
do so as a priority.  More important for the categorization 
of the significance of an offense is the “standard” sentence 
that is applied, and that is to be found in the behavior and 
language of the courts.  The language of the courts suggests 
that in sentencing three people (one for possession of x 
grams of drug y, one for selling x grams for £ z, and the last 
for laundering £ z), the approach of the court should be that 
the sentence of the dealer is greater than that of the 
launderer, whose is greater than the possessor.  In 1999, 
for the first time, a sentencing case came before the courts 
in which the launderer had no other allegation against 
him/her.  The court took a very harsh line, indeed.50  
Nonetheless, there are so few cases decided on the 
sentencing of offenders, under the money laundering 
legislation, that there is little guidance as to the underlying 
rationale of the offense to be found in the sentences that 
have been imposed. 
b. Comparator Offenses 
In the search for a justifying account of the vice in 
laundering, one analytical approach, therefore, is to have 
regard to possible comparators—offenses that might be 
thought to provide analogies.  There are four types of 
serious offenses to which there are some obvious 
similarities. 
1.  Drug Dealing? 
There are some indications in the earlier cases and 
legislation on laundering that the launderer is regarded 
more agreeably than the trafficker. The Home Office 
 
 50. The Queen v. Ussama Sammy El-Kurd, [2001] Crim. L.R. 234 (Eng. C.A.) 
(defendant fined £1m and jailed for fourteen years, reduced on appeal to twelve). 
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Working Group on Confiscation51 pointed out that when 
enacting the 1986 Drug Trafficking Offenses Act, 
Parliament had regarded money launderers as lesser 
offenders than drug traffickers.52  But the 1995 Proceeds of 
Crime Act had given the courts power to make the 
assumptions when dealing with the offenses covered by the 
1988 Criminal Justice Act, and the continued existence of 
the exception now appears anomalous.53 In R v. 
Greenwood,54 the Court of Appeal held that money 
laundering was “nearly as serious” as drug dealing.  Now 
the exact moral wrong a drug dealer does is itself by no 
means clear.55  This statement seems to assume that the 
seriousness of an act of laundering is directly proportional 
to that of the predicate.  Unless laundering is a form of 
complicity, there is no reason why the vice in laundering 
need be, in any way, related to the means by which the 
money was acquired. 
In any event, it was easier to see a connection between 
the gravity of drug dealing and laundering at the time56 
when the only laundering offenses were offenses of 
laundering the proceeds of drug dealing.  At that time, the 
governing rationale might well have been that laundering 
was a form of complicity in dealing. And following a 
relatively unsophisticated “derivative” theory of complicity, 
the accomplice could not be guilty of a more serious, and 
generally was guilty of a less serious offense, than the 
perpetrator. 
 
 51. Great Britain Home Office Working Group on Confiscation, Third Report: 
Criminal Assets (1998). 
 52. During the debates on the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) 
Act 1990, the Minister of State for the Home Office, Earl Ferrers, expressly 
maintained this distinction but without making clear the grounds upon which it 
rested.  See 514 Parl. Deb., H.L. (6th ser.) (1990) 514. 
 53. The Working Group’s recommendation that section 4(5) be repealed was 
affirmed by Recovering the Proceeds of Crime, supra note 32, and effected by the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
 54. The Queen v. Greenwood, 16 Crim. App. R. 614 (1995)  [England, Court of 
Appeal, Criminal Division]. 
 55. Peter Alldridge, Dealing with Drug Dealing, in Harm and Justification 
239 (A.T.H. Smith et al. eds., 1996). 
 56. There was such a time in English Law between 1990 and 1994. 
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2.  Counterfeiting? 
Another possible comparitor is counterfeiting.  Both 
are crimes involving the remote causing of huge remote 
damage which is difficult to identify.  Money laundering 
may well be seen as a means of undermining the unit of 
exchange, but counterfeiting money is more than a means 
of obtaining by deception.  If the counterfeit is entirely 
successful (the counterfeit currency is undetectable and 
enters circulation), there will be no identifiable loser.  But 
the introduction of counterfeit currency into circulation will 
generate an increase—albeit very small, even when the 
sums of counterfeit currency are quite large—in the rate of 
inflation, because the cash supply will have increased.  But 
that is not the real risk either in counterfeiting or 
laundering.  The sources of anxiety are that there will be 
an alternative source of money to the “legitimately” 
powerful, and that the existence of such a source will be 
subversive of respect for that established authority. 
3.  Handling Stolen Goods? 
In many ways, the panic surrounding laundering now 
has echoes of that surrounding Wild and the other thief-
takers in the eighteenth century.57  Offenses of handling 
have the obvious similarity to offenses of laundering 
inasmuch that they are offenses of disposal of unlawfully 
acquired property.  There is a substantial overlap between 
handling and laundering offenses, and there have been 
suggestions58 that the laundering offenses are little but an 
updated version of handling.  The sense in which the two 
offenses are similar is that both create, and deal in, 
unlawful markets.59 
 
 57. Gerald Howson, It Takes a Thief: The Life and Times of Jonathan Wild 
(1987); 1 Sir Leon Zadzinowica, A History of English Criminal Law and Its 
Administration from 1750 682-84 (1968). 
 58. Sir John Smith, Note to R v. Gibson, 2002 Crim. L.R. 479. 
 59. The appropriate sentencing strategy for handling stolen goods is currently 
under consideration by the Sentencing Advisory Panel at http://www.sentencing-
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4.  Smuggling 
Drug dealing, handling, and counterfeiting operate as 
comparitors to laundering without sharing its most 
significant distinguishing feature: its international 
character.  Reform efforts continually target the changes in 
enforcement procedure that would be necessary to prevent 
money being spirited away through other jurisdictions.  
The economic accounts60 of the gravity of laundering rely 
for their force upon the effect of laundering, upon two or 
more national economies or the global economy.  If the only 
serious economic damage from laundering depends for its 
effect upon the international movement of money and 
goods, then there is clearly a case to be made for restricting 
the application of the criminal sanction, if it is to be 
imposed at all, to the cases where the proceeds of crime are 
moved between jurisdictions.  In this account, the closest 
comparitor crimes to laundering are smuggling, and (in 
jurisdictions where exchange controls exist) exchange 
control violations.61 
The peculiarities of smuggling are that it takes its 
significance from the existence of boundaries between 
markets.  From the eighteenth century, at the latest, the 
excise man had a function in raising public finance.  But he 
also had another function: He was the instrument of 
economic protectionism.  The smuggler, per contra, was the 
embodiment of free enterprise.  Not only was the smuggler 
cutting cost to the consumer, (by not paying duty) he was 
also striking a blow against protectionism.  Adam Smith 
and Beccaria62 both expressed admiration for smugglers.  
For Smith, the smuggler was: 
[A] person who, though no doubt highly blamable for 
 
advisory-panel.gov.uk (last modified Sept. 27, 2000). 
 60. See infra section IV. 
 61. In the United Kingdom the Exchange Controls Act of 1947 was repealed 
by Finance Act 1987 § 68 (Eng.). 
 62. Cesare Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishments ch. 33 (Adolph Caso ed., 
Int’l Pocket Libr. 2d ed. 1992) (1778). 
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violating the laws of his country, is frequently incapable of 
violating those of natural justice, and would have been, in 
every respect, an excellent citizen had not the laws of his 
country made that a crime which nature never intended to 
be so.63 
On the same sort of account, the launderer is 
somebody who challenges attempts—albeit not expressly 
protectionist attempts—to isolate one market from another.  
As with smuggling, there is no a priori moral wrong.  On 
this account, the gravity of laundering will depend upon 
the seriousness with which these attempts are taken. 
c.  Variables in Determining Sentence 
Another approach to the task of quantification of the 
gravity of respective offenses of laundering for the purposes 
of sentencing is to identify aggravating and mitigating 
factors.  By their close consideration, it might be possible to 
gain a clearer picture of the vice in the offense.  Assume 
that the criminalization of money laundering is justified.  
How can distinctions be made between various ways of 
committing the offense?  Consider some of the possible 
variables.  Does it, and should it, matter to the sentence 
imposed upon someone convicted of a laundering offense: 
1. that the money laundered was a large or a small 
amount; 
2. that the money laundered was the product of a more 
serious or a less serious crime; 
3. that the laundering was done knowingly, rather 
than merely suspecting, that the money was of 
unlawful provenance; 
 
 63. 2 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations 429 (Edwin Cannan ed., U. Chi. Press 1976) (1776). 
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4. that it can be shown that the availability of the 
laundering route made the difference between the 
crime being committed and not; 
5. that the money was acquired inside or outside the 
jurisdiction, or was to be invested inside or outside the 
jurisdiction; 
6. how the money, when laundered, was to be 
deployed? 
In each of these cases, an argument can be made that 
the distinction should be regarded as having significance. 
Taking them in turn: 
As to (1), in all property crime, ceteris paribus, 
quantum is significant.  As to (2), if the wrong in money 
laundering is seen as relating so closely to the harm of the 
predicate offense as for it to amount to a form of complicity, 
then the nature of the predicate offense should inform the 
degree of seriousness attached to the laundering 
transaction.  On the other hand, if the punishment is not 
being directed against a form of complicity but against the 
causing of economic harms, then sentencing will ignore the 
nature of the predicate offense.  If the offense is directed 
against both, then considerations about mens rea will be 
taken into account.  Thus far, there has been no suggestion 
in the United Kingdom literature that there should be 
differential sentencing according to whether the offense 
was charged under the 1994 Drug Trafficking Act or the 
1988 Criminal Justice Act, that is, whether the predicate 
offense was a drug trafficking offense or not.  But that 
would be a consistent consequence of the “complicity” 
position. 
As to (3), how significant is it that the laundering was 
done knowingly, rather than suspecting that the money 
was of unlawful provenance?  It is standard treatment of 
questions of mens rea that the “higher” mental state will 
give rise either to a separate offense, or at the least a 
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greater punishment for the same offense.  The issue in 
money laundering is, however, rather different because the 
defendant can be expected to have regard to his/her own 
mental state.  It is the existence of the mental state that 
gives rise to the obligation to report or not to take part in 
the process.  A defendant will know whether or not s/he is 
suspicious, and, if s/he is, will fall under the criminal 
proscription. 
A person generally will not know at the time of acting 
whether s/he is reckless as to some consequence, because 
the nature of the inquiry is such that it generally can only 
be conducted ex post. A person may know, however, 
whether or not s/he suspects the provenance of funds with 
which s/he deals.  If s/he suspects, then s/he knows and the 
obligation arises just as much as if s/he knows.  If the 
knowledge or suspicion required for liability is taken to be 
merely the thing which imposes the obligation to act (in the 
case of the offenses of failing to disclose or failing to operate 
a proper system), or not to act, (in the case of the offenses 
of assisting another person to retain the benefit of criminal 
conduct or drug dealing or acquisition, possession or use of 
the proceeds of criminal conduct or drug dealing), then 
variations in mental state will not affect sentence.  If, on 
the other hand, the knowledge or suspicion is not merely a 
precondition to that obligation, but also a mens rea 
descriptor of the way in which the obligation is discharged, 
then it should be taken into account. 
Variable (4) raises a causal issue, which will arise 
rarely in practice but which focuses attention again upon 
the rationale for the offenses.  One of the principal reasons 
asserted for the existence of the offenses is that people who 
commit crimes will be less likely to do so if it is less easy to 
have access to the profits in useable form.  If it could be 
established that the predicate offense would not have 
happened at all without the availability of the launderer, 
then there is a case for suggesting that the launderer’s 
participation was as instigator, as in the case of the 
participation of a handler in a theft to order of a unique 
artifact.  In this case, the solution most consistent with the 
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sentencing system is for the commissioning launderer to be 
treated as a handler of stolen goods.  In the cases where the 
predicate crime would have occurred anyway, then this 
comparison is not available.  However, it might be argued 
that where the contribution of the launderer is a causa sine 
qua non, the crime is aggravated because his/her conduct 
both causes crime to occur and profits from it, rather than 
just the latter. 
As to (5), if the source jurisdiction of the money, or 
other aspects of the “money trail,” take on international 
elements, then similar questions arise with a charge of 
possession with intent to supply: Does it make a difference 
that drugs possessed in jurisdiction A are intended for 
supply in jurisdiction B, having been made in jurisdiction 
C?  Which jurisdiction is most legitimately aggrieved?  
Suppose someone is arrested in an airport in jurisdiction A, 
through which s/he is in transit.  S/he is in the process of 
carrying banknotes generated by the sale of drugs from 
jurisdiction B to jurisdiction C,  where the proceeds are 
going to be banked, with a view to their eventual 
investment in jurisdiction Z.  How this contributes to the 
evaluation of the moral wrong in, or the sentence for 
laundering, depends upon the obligation which the one 
country has to another.  The rhetoric of the “international 
community” and the operation of multi-national 
enforcement groups and mechanisms seek to suggest that 
whichever is the sentencing jurisdiction ought to sentence 
on the basis that all the offenses took place in a cumulative 
international jurisdiction, to which all the harm ascribed to 
the laundering could be imputed.  If this position were not 
adopted, then sentencers would have to filter out harms 
ascribable elsewhere.  That, however, would be inconsistent 
with the imposition of liability in the first place. 
Variable (6) raises the question whether it would be a 
defense or a mitigation to give the money to charity, or 
another good cause, or to the Exchequer.  The issue here is 
whether the use to which the money is to be put has any 
effect upon the degree of turpitude that is ascribed to it in 
sentencing.  If the money is to be put to socially beneficial 
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use, then it is difficult to see a vice at all in laundering.  If 
it is necessary to criminalize socially beneficial laundering 
because it would be impossible to isolate socially harmful 
cases, then social benefit should at least be a mitigation. 
I conclude that it is impossible to generate an 
acceptable justifying account of the criminalization of 
laundering from the “moral” arguments and that detained 
consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors only 
reveals incoherences in the existing law.  Theorists have 
tended to regard the insertion of considerations of 
economics into the criminal law as raising sets of 
arguments distinct from the moral.64  One of the important 
things that Feinberg incorporated into the analysis in The 
Moral Limits of the Criminal Law was to reintegrate these 
considerations.65  Harm worthy of the invocation of criminal 
law can, of course, extend to economic damage and to 
remote damage, but the arguments for laundering being 
regarded as a harmful phenomenon require analysis.  It is 
to those arguments that consideration now turns. 
IV. RELOCATING THE HARM - THE ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF LAUNDERING IN INDIVIDUAL 
JURISDICTIONS 
For any given national government, there are obvious 
immediate advantages to having money laundered into its 
own economy, rather than into another.  A single anecdote 
serves to make this point forcefully.  In the wake of the 
collapse of the U.S.S.R., criminal codes were put in place in 
a number of former Soviet Socialist Republics which 
mirrored more closely the legal framework and values of 
the West.  Consultants were employed in their drafting.  In 
 
 64. Criminal law was “generally considered the domain par excellence of 
moral rather than economic thinking in law.” Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193, 1230 (1985).  Symposium, 
Blackmail, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1565-1975 (1993); see also Peter Alldridge, 
Relocating Criminal Law 13-15 (2000). 
 65. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self 134-42 (1986) (discussing the 
treatment of the economic consequences of motorcycling without a helmet). 
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a meeting between one of these consultants and a very 
senior government minister in one such republic, the 
minister, reviewing a provision outlawing money 
laundering, said (loosely translated): “Let me get this 
straight: money laundering is where people make money 
unlawfully elsewhere and bring it to this country and 
invest it—is that correct?”  The answer was in the 
affirmative.  “Why should I be against that?” came the 
response.66  The Realpolitik of the minister reflects the 
“dominant strategy” which game theory produces of 
permitting money laundering.67  If there are two countries 
(A and B) deciding, on the basis of economic self-interest, 
whether or not to criminalize money laundering, one of the 
considerations will be what the other country does.  If 
Country B chooses to criminalize, then country A’s self- 
interest will be to permit money laundering, because then 
A’s financial institutions will receive all the profits (as 
between A and B) of laundering.  And B will shoulder the 
burdens of law enforcement.  On the other hand, if B 
chooses to permit laundering, the optimal choice for A is 
also to permit laundering for the same reasons.  However, 
if both countries permit laundering, then the outcome is 
said68 to be Pareto69 inefficient because both sets of 
financial institutions benefit less.  It also  provides a policy 
basis driving the underlying criminal activity, which 
damages the licit economy. 
 
 66. See Vito Tanzi, International Monetary Fund Working Paper 96/55, 
Money Laundering and the International Financial System 5 (1996) (noting that 
“[r]ecently some small countries have almost advertised their willingness to 
accept laundered money.”). 
 67. See Brent Fisse & David Fraser, Some Antipodean Skepticisms About 
Forfeiture, Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime, and Money Laundering Offenses, 
44 Ala. L. Rev. 737 (1993); Rob Norton, In Defense of Money Laundering, 
Fortune, Sept. 27, 1999, at 37; Matthew B. Comstock, GATT and GATS: A Public 
Morals Attack on Money Laundering, 15 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 139 (1994) 
(explaining the game theory approach). 
 68. See Comstock, supra note 67, at 162 (citing Barbara Webster & Michael S. 
McCampbell, National Institute of Justice, International Money Laundering: 
Research and Investigation 6 (1992)). 
 69. An allocation or distribution of goods and services in an economy is said to 
be Pareto optimal if no alternative allocation could make at least one individual 
better off, without making anyone worse off. 
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If money laundering were to be considered simply to be 
the problem of each individual jurisdiction, then an 
economic approach to the questions of whether and how to 
regulate would include consideration of the costs of 
regulation.  This includes bureaucracies, courts, prisons, 
and tax revenue foregone when criminal organizations are 
prevented from laundering money into legitimate 
businesses that pay tax and create honest jobs.  It would 
also include less tangible costs, such as loss of privacy of 
the people whose transactions were scrutinized. 
It is the international dimension to criminal law which 
has overridden the self-interest of individual states. 
International agreements are possible because, unlike the 
prisoner’s dilemma case,70 the parties are able to 
communicate with one another.  Comstock argues that the 
Vienna Convention creates incentives for some nations to 
cheat.  An unscrupulous nation knows with near certainty 
that many states will act against laundering, so the 
dilemma does not arise. It can attract laundered money 
without fear of competition.71Comstock’s view rests upon 
the absence of a system of sanctions for refusal to 
criminalize and argues for a system of penalties through 
the international trade regime (in particular, through the 
World Trade Organization) for failure to criminalize.  
These systems permit a system of sanctions on public 
moral grounds, for whose invocation he argues. 
Whether or not his account is entirely correct,72 
Comstock does highlight the point that laundering is 
behavior whose dangers only exist to a collectivity beyond 
 
 70. The dilemma is the case of two suspects in custody, both of whom know 
that their own position will be best served if both refuse deals with the police, but 
each suspect also realises he will be worse off if he does not deal with the police 
and his confederate does. 
 71. See Comstock, supra note 67, at 162. 
 72. The major problem is that Comstock fails to distinguish criminalization as 
a matter of law from active pursuit as a matter of criminal justice policy. The 
underlying assumption of his analysis is that levels of enforcement do not vary 
significantly between nations that criminalize.  (For a nation attempting to secure 
the benefits of being part of the “International Community,” having money in its 
economy rather than in another country’s might well allow a disjunction between 
the rhetoric and the reality of its approach). 
This content downloaded from 131.251.254.13 on Thu, 27 Feb 2014 09:57:25 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ALLDRIDGEMACROREV 1/29/2002  9:47 AM 
2001] THE CRIME OF MONEY LAUNDERING 305 
the nation-state.  And in the sense that it provides a 
common enemy, this can serve to provide a focus for those 
attempting to enhance international solidarity and co-
operation over a range of issues.  Money laundering is the 
first serious crime whose existence can be directly related 
to global economic concerns, rather than those of individual 
jurisdictions. That, more than any other reason, is why its 
emergence has coincided with globalization. It is, therefore, 
important to review the accounts which are to be found of 
the international economic ramifications of laundering—its 
effect upon global markets and the global economy.  It is in 
this area that the economists working for major 
international organizations, particularly the Financial 
Action Task Force, child of the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the 
International Monetary Fund, have been very active.  It is 
to those arguments that the article will now turn. 
It should also be noted at the outset that the economic 
arguments are generally expressed to show some 
detrimental outcome from laundering.  What the writers 
have done, however, is to concentrate upon the overall 
effect of laundering.  This does not necessarily argue for 
any particular legal response.  Proceeding from “harm” 
principles,73 in order to provide a coherent basis upon which 
to criminalize, there must at least be an identifiable harm.  
To move from that outcome to the claim that 
criminalization is an appropriate response requires further 
argument to be supplied, and, in liberal theory,74 the 
alternative legal mechanisms need to be shown to be 
inadequate. 
(1) Money Laundering has the Capacity to Undermine 
 
 73. In the sense identified by Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing (1988),  x 
that is that the existence of the harm is a reason—neither necessary nor 
sufficient, for criminalization. 
 74. Stretching back to Beccaria, the idea, honored in recent years far more in 
the breach than the observance, of criminal law as the ultimum remedium—the 
mechanism to be invoked upon the failure of all alternatives. For a modern 
statement, see Nils Jareborg, What Kind of Criminal Law Do We Want? 14 
Scandinavian Stud. in Criminology 17 (1995). 
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Financial Markets 
The major economic argument resounding through the 
literature is that laundering has a detrimental effect on the 
operation of markets.75 Tanzi, an IMF economist, argues 
that the resources that go into illegal activity might 
otherwise be directed legally.76  Money laundering allocates 
dirty money around the world not so much on the basis of 
expected rates of return, but on the basis of the ease of 
avoiding controls, and this is inefficient.77  As a 
consequence, the world allocation of resources is distorted 
first by the criminal activities themselves and then by the 
way the dirty money is allocated.78  Now it may be the case 
that economic statistics are skewed by laundering, but this 
is hardly a reason to put in place criminal offenses 
commanding serious sanctions and very significant 
enforcement powers and mechanisms.  It is simply a reason 
to find more reliable means of generating economic 
statistics.  The argument from efficiency and the allocation 
of dirty money, if it can be substantiated, is far the more 
serious of the two. 
A large stock of laundered capital might bring 
instability to the world market.  The total assets controlled 
by criminal organizations may, so it is said, be so large that 
to transfer them from one jurisdiction to another may have 
important economic consequences. At the national level, 
this will affect exchange and interest rates.  Integration of 
financial markets implies that difficulties can spread from 
market to market, transforming a national problem into a 
systemic one.  This is the thesis which, if correct, accounts 
for the harm of money laundering. It only ever argues, 
however, for the criminalization of international 
laundering, not laundering in one jurisdiction only. 
 
 75. Recovering the Proceeds of Crime, supra note 32, para. 8.12. 
 76. Tanzi, supra note 66. 
 77. See Recovering the Proceeds of Crime, supra note 32, para. 11.34. 
 78. Tanzi, supra note 66, at iii. 
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(2) The Microeconomic Effects of Laundering 
The microeconomic argument is easier to grasp.  The 
microeconomic effect of laundering is more tangible and 
may well be more significant. The effect upon the 
identifiable business which is driven under and whose 
owner loses her job and house because the business of the 
competitor was subsidized with, and thus laundering, drug 
money, is more direct and telling.79 Nonetheless, the 
argument is not overwhelming.  There are two sorts of 
responses available.  One is to challenge the stereotypes of 
how the money is deployed. This can only be done by 
attention to the micro data.  Petrus van Duyne80 suggests 
that the incidence of this sort of competition is far less than 
is suggested by the law enforcement agencies. Second (even 
if he is wrong and the microeconomic consequences of 
laundering are indeed widespread), in these sorts of cases 
the remedy might best be found in competition law.  What 
causes the damage is the cross-subsidy, not the fact of its 
illegal source. 
Masciandaro81 argues further that laundering has a 
pollutant effect.  Once it takes place, then more and more 
property will become tainted.82 This is true, and 
particularly true if tax evasion is to be treated like other 
forms of “criminal conduct” for the purposes of money 
laundering.83  But the very rate at which the pollution 
spreads might be regarded as an indication of the high 
degree of criminogenesis attributable to attempts to 
regulate laundering, and consequently provides a reason 
 
 79. Recovering the Proceeds of Crime, supra note 32, para. 6.5. 
 80. Van Duyne, supra note 33. 
 81. Donato Masciandaro, Money Laundering: The Economics of Regulation, 7 
Eur. J.L. & Econ. 225-40 (1999); see also Donato Masciandaro, The Economics of 
Money Laundering (L’Economia del Riciclaggio e Della Politica Antiriciclaggio), 
LIV Giornale Degli Economisti e Annali di Economia 211-28 (1995). 
 82. See Gianandrea Goisis, Economic Impact of Rules Against Money 
Laundering, 43 Riviista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
303-30 (1996). 
 83. See Peter Alldridge, Are Tax Evasion Offenses Predicate Offenses for 
Money Laundering?, 4 J. Money Laundering Control 6 (2001). 
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not to regulate. 
(3) Corruption of Professionals 
A further argument, upon which little reliance can be 
placed, is that allowing money laundering invites 
corruption of the professions, particularly lawyers, 
bankers, and accountants.84  Quirk, for example, suggests 
that one of the ways in which laundering affects the 
banking sector is by corrupting bank officials.85  He claims: 
Money laundering activities can corrupt parts of the 
financial system and undermine governance of banks. Once 
bank managers have become corrupted by the sizeable sums 
of money involved in money laundering, non-market 
behavior can be introduced into operating areas other than 
those directly related to the money laundering, which 
creates risks for the safety and soundness of the bank. Bank 
supervisors also can be corrupted or intimidated, which 
would reduce the effectiveness of supervision.86 
If there were empirical evidence to bear this 
contention out, it still need not argue for confiscation 
provisions or for criminalization.  It may just argue for 
different systems of banking regulation. However, there are 
jurisdictions, in which there are long traditions of banking 
 
 84. For example, in a statement commenting upon statistics for numbers of 
reports and urging the European Commission to go even further than the draft 
amended directive, Economic Secretary to the Treasury Melanie Johnson 
highlighted money laundering’s “capacity to undermine financial markets and to 
corrupt professional advisers.”  Treasury Urges EC to Do More to Fight Money 
Laundering, Accountancy Age, Oct. 14, 1999, at 7. 
 85. Peter Quirk, International Monetary Fund Working Paper 96/66, 
Macroeconomic Implications of Money Laundering 24 (1996). 
 86. In a footnote Quirk adds: 
Traditionally, anti-money laundering efforts are closer to the 
responsibilities of government bodies such as ministries of justice. Anti-
money laundering efforts tend to be more politically sensitive than  the 
traditional areas of central banking and an assumption of such 
responsibilities could possibly lead to less autonomy for the central bank, 
with spill-over effects into the monetary policy area. 
Id. at 25. 
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without asking questions of the provenance of the money, 
which command enormous confidence.  Switzerland, until 
the banking secrecy laws was revoked,87 and Lichtenstein 
(still) have such reputations. The phenomena Quirk 
contemplates do not seem to present too much difficulty in 
those jurisdictions.  That is to say, Quirk’s argument only 
has force if the bank officials are in fact likely to be 
corrupted.  In a jurisdiction where (for whatever reason, 
whether moral rectitude or the efficacy of their supervision) 
there is little danger of bank officials being corrupted, the 
argument lacks force.  On the other hand, in a jurisdiction 
where bank officials can be bought in significant numbers, 
then that of itself is likely to be a serious problem, and 
there are very probably greater problems than money 
laundering.  It may very well be that the same kind of 
response can be made to the more general “corruption of 
the professions” argument. 
(4) A Specific Consequential Claim—Harm to the 
Banking System 
Amongst the wider consequential claims, the effect of 
laundering upon the banking system is frequently a 
particular concern. Smith writes, “the fear of financial 
regulators is that when credit and financial institutions are 
used to launder proceeds from criminal activities . . . the 
soundness and stability of the [particular] institution 
concerned and confidence in the financial system as a 
whole could be seriously jeopardized.”88  Likewise, Cranston 
asserts that, “[money laundering] affects public confidence 
in, and the stability of, the banking system.”89  This is 
clearly a commonly held view, but why exactly is it that the 
fact that a bank launders money adversely affects 
 
 87. Shelby R. Du Pasquier, The Swiss Anti-Money Laundering Legislation, 13 
J. Int’l Banking L. 160 (1998). 
 88. Geoffrey Smith, Competition in the European Financial Services Industry: 
The Free Movement of Capital versus the Regulation of Money Laundering, 13 U. 
Pa. J. Int’l Bus. L. 101, 111 (1992). 
 89. Ross Cranston, Principles of Banking Law 75 (1997). 
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confidence, either in that bank or in banking generally? 
One of the dangers is said to be in banking liquidity.  
The argument goes like this: If a bank deals with investors, 
the provenance of whose money is illegal, then the kinds of 
demands which those investors will make are less 
predictable than those coming from more conventional 
investors.  The proportion of its assets, which a bank will 
need to keep liquid to meet such eventualities without 
entirely collapsing, is affected by the sorts of clients with 
whom they choose to do business.  It is, however, by no 
means clear that these kinds of effects have arisen in banks 
that launder money.  Those who make the argument that 
money laundering endangers banks, frequently do so by 
reference to the most famous example of the collapse of a 
bank which did a great deal of business laundering money, 
the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI).In 
October 1988, the U.S. Federal government charged that 
BCCI and nine of its officers were involved in laundering 
more than $32 million in drug money.  Federal prosecutors 
alleged that bank officers of U.S. branches of BCCI took 
funds which they knew to be from U.S. cocaine sales. The 
prosecutors further alleged that the bank officers invested 
the funds in certificates of deposit issued by BCCI banks in 
France, the U.K., Luxembourg, the Bahamas, Panama, and 
South America and made loans to drug dealers.  The loan 
proceeds were eventually wired to the Florida branch of 
BCCI.90  They were then transferred back, without further 
ado, to members of the Medellin cartel.  The indictment in 
Tampa was the precipitant to closer regulatory attention to 
all of the groups’ activities.  Before the Tampa arrests, 
BCCI (in common with many other financial institutions in 
the U.K.) had made no disclosures to the National Drugs 
Intelligence Unit (NDIU).91  Thereafter, following steps to 
overhaul and tighten compliance with international 
guidelines on the prevention of money laundering, many 
 
 90. They would not have been subject to the $10,000 Cash Transaction 
Reporting rule. 
 91. Which preceded the National Criminal Intelligence Service as the agency 
to whom reports had to be directed. 
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disclosures were made.  The opinion of NDIU is that, after 
a late start, BCCI made a positive move in the direction of 
due compliance.92  The bank’s U.K. operation was closed by 
regulators on 19 July 1991; when it collapsed, BCCI was 
insolvent to the tune of $3.2 billion worldwide.93 
Was there a causal connection between the collapse of 
the bank and the laundering to which it was a party?  Or 
did it just happen that a bank, which committed huge 
frauds, also permitted large amounts of laundering, and 
that, if the frauds had not taken place, but the laundering 
had, the bank, upon being closed by the regulators for poor 
money laundering compliance, would have been found to be 
solvent and the creditors would have been paid?  Although 
BCCI is inextricably connected in the public imagination 
with money laundering,94 it is by no means clear that the 
laundering, which undoubtedly took place, was a causal 
contributor to the fact that when the bank ceased to trade 
it was insolvent.  The alternative account is that the 
depositors in the bank were the victims of huge frauds and 
that the laundering was largely irrelevant.  The 
subsequent reports found that, “[t]he systematic frauds 
now thought to have been practised in BCCI were on a 
scale that had never been known before.”95  That is, BCCI 
was insolvent because money was stolen, not because 
money was laundered.  If a bank is taking investments 
from money launderers, why does that constitute any 
threat to the particular bank, or to the system as a whole?  
There are clear reasons why launders might actually be 
regarded by banks as desirable customers.  For example, 
they will not care whether or not the highest rates of 
interest are available.  The will be happy to receive a lower, 
or even negative rate.  The bank need not make any risky 
 
 92. Sir Thomas Henry Bingham, Return to an Address of the Honourable the 
House of Commons Dated 22 October 1992 for the Inquiry into the Supervision of 
the Bank of Credit and Commerce International para. 2.554 (1992). 
 93. Id. para. 2.193. 
 94. LEXIS searches in the news file for documents containing the two 
expressions “Money Laundering” and “BCCI” are interrupted because it probably 
will retrieve more than 1,000 documents. 
 95. Bingham, supra note 92, para. 2.3. 
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investments with their money, and it can conform easily to 
any liquidity requirements.96  If legislation is to be put in 
place to criminalize laundering based upon empirical 
claims about the banking system, then clear evidence 
should be required. 
A final response, which may be made to the claim that 
money laundering endangers the banking system, is that it 
is of the (limited) nature of the claim that it can only 
provide a reason to intervene in money laundering which 
employs the banking system. Much of the current discourse 
surrounding laundering, including that dealing with the 
revised E.U. directive,97 is directed towards the expansion 
of the range of activities subject to the regulatory 
framework.  Where laundering is conducted by other means 
than the banking system, (for example by the use of 
bureaux de change or informal methods of transfer) or in 
other markets, the banking system is not endangered.  And 
there is no independent reason for state intervention 
supplied by the “banking collapse” argument.  There is no 
suggestion that bureaux de change or antiques markets will 
collapse as a result of failure to regulate against 
laundering.  The case for banking to be treated differently 
in this regard should be viewed with skepticism. 
(5) Further Claimed Effects of Laundering 
Quirk attributes to money laundering the following 
further series of macroeconomic harms:98 
1. Policy mistakes due to measurement errors in 
macroeconomic statistics arising from money 
laundering; 
2. Changes in demand for money that seem unrelated 
 
 96. Compare Banking Act 1987, c. 22, § 60 (Eng.), appearing to think special 
provision necessary. 
 97. See Council Directive 1991/308 EEC, supra note 7. 
 98. Quirk, supra note 85, at 27-28. 
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to measured changes in fundamentals; 
3. Volatility in exchange rates and interest rates, due 
to unanticipated cross border transfers of funds; 
4.  Other country-specific distributional effects or asset 
price bubbles, due to disposition of “black money”; 
5. Development of an unstable liability base and 
unsound asset structures of individual financial 
institutions, (or groups) creating risks of systemic 
crises and hence, monetary instability; 
6. Effects on tax collection and public expenditure 
allocation, due to mis- and under-reporting of income; 
7. Misallocation of resources due to distortions in 
relative asset and commodity prices arising from 
laundering activities; 
8. Contamination effects on legal transactions, due to 
the perceived possibility of being associated with 
crime. 
Taking these claims in turn, argument (1) is that 
money laundering generates policy mistakes due to 
measurement errors in macroeconomic statistics.  As a 
result of these unexpected capital movements,99 
policymaking is detrimentally affected.  For example, the 
policy makers of a country that, in the face of high 
inflation, overvalued exchange rate and a large fiscal 
deficit also experienced capital inflow, might be less 
inclined to change its interest rate policies.100  Quirk’s 
 
 99. “Seeming to defy the laws of economics.”  Tanzi, supra note 66, at 7. 
 100. Id. 
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second economic consequence of laundering (2) is little 
more than a function of (1).  Changes in demand for money 
that appear unrelated to measured changes in 
fundamentals may be a consequence of laundering.  But it 
hardly provides a reason for criminalization and huge 
expenditure on a regulatory structure.  The simple 
response would be to get better economic data upon the 
basis of which to formulate policy.  Furthermore, since data 
on international flows of cash have been discredited as 
indicia even of the amount of money that is laundered,101 it 
is difficult to see why they should be taken so seriously for 
the purposes of generating economic policy. 
The next two consequences identified by Quirk (3 and 
4), volatility in exchange rates and other price “bubbles,” 
are the sorts of things that economists regard as being 
“harms.” But whether they are sufficiently clearly 
established as being caused by laundering, or sufficiently 
important in terms of avoidable damage done, is far less 
clear.  Exchange rates are notoriously unpredictable.  It is 
entirely lawful for someone with enough money to behave 
in such a way as to impact upon the exchange rate.  That 
was the way in which, for example, speculators drove 
sterling out of the European exchange rate mechanism in 
1993. 
As to (5), Quirk argues that development of an 
unstable liability base and unsound asset structures of 
individual financial institutions (or groups) creates risks of 
systemic crises and hence, monetary instability.  This 
argument is best viewed in the context of the effects of 
money laundering upon banking. As is shown elsewhere,102 
the more alarmist claims as to laundering and banking 
solvency are difficult to substantiate.103 Quirk’s sixth 
argument, that money laundering has deleterious effects on 
 
 101. These data have become increasingly poor indicators as cash has been 
supplanted by other forms of money and as foreign exchange trading has 
increased exponentially with the introduction of derivatives trading. 
 102. See supra section IV (4). 
 103. Of course, this argument would not apply in jurisdictions or systems in 
which exchange rates are fixed. 
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tax collection and public expenditure allocation, due to mis- 
and under-reporting of income, is, if anything, an argument 
for better tax collection methods.  The relationship between 
tax evasion and money laundering is central to the modern 
international campaign, in respect of laundering.  But the 
argument in this case seems overstated. Of course, money 
that is laundered for reasons other than tax evasion also 
represents income that is also an evasion of taxes, thus, 
compounding the economic distortions.  However, in 
general, taxpayers will not declare unlawful income, 
whether or not there is a regulatory regime in place in 
respect of laundering.  If the argument is really that 
regulating laundering will reduce the incidence of initial 
crime, then better evidence is necessary. 
Quirk’s seventh argument, that there will be 
misallocation of resources due to distortions in relative 
asset and commodity prices arising from laundering 
activities, simply restates (1), and has available the same 
response.  As to Quirk’s final argument, that if action 
against laundering is not taken then that will be 
contamination effects on legal transactions due to the 
perceived possibility of being associated with crime.  Some 
lawful transactions with Russian entities, for example, 
have become more desirable because of their association 
with laundering.  This is the sort of anecdotal evidence that 
ought to be treated skeptically. 
a. The Neglected Steps in the Economic Argument 
The economists argue that laundering is harmful.  At 
their strongest, these arguments seem to rest upon 
empirical foundations, which require clear supporting 
evidence.  At their weakest, the claims can be dismissed as 
accounts of any economic harm, let alone as grounds to 
invoke the criminal law. But let us grant their assumptions 
and consider the form which a law of laundering might 
take which was grounded in one or more of these economic 
theses.  Assume that the overall phenomenon of laundering 
was one which is economically damaging on a global scale.  
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And that each individual act of laundering is a causal 
contributor to damage to the international economy in 
proportion to the amount laundered.  The damage to the 
international economy accrues in unidentifiable countries, 
and while there are many estimates of the amount of 
money that is laundered globally, even if these claims were 
able to be supported no particular quantum follows for the 
economic damage done by laundering. 
The economic arguments outlined above suggest that 
at least some money laundering creates conditions under 
which serious detrimental economic effects accrue.  That is 
enough to support greater efforts to improve the rate at 
which the profits of crime are confiscated.  But it is not 
enough, without more, to argue for criminalization.  Within 
a liberal account of the proper limits of the criminal law, 
further arguments would still need to be made out.  First, 
there is the question of the place of criminal law in the 
legislative armory.  Feinberg provided a most searching 
analysis of the sorts of harms against which, in a liberal 
society, it was legitimate to invoke the criminal law, and 
the cases where it might be legitimate to invoke the 
criminal law notwithstanding the absence of harm.  Many 
other liberal theorists argue that criminalization should be 
regarded not as a knee-jerk response, but as a last resort 
only to be invoked when all other methods of legal 
regulation of the phenomenon in question have been 
canvassed and found wanting.104  There is a range of 
alternative means of regulation of laundering that could be 
tried.  In particular, if confiscation works successfully to 
deprive criminals of the overwhelming preponderance of 
their profits, then there is little independent case for 
criminalization.  Alternatively, if confiscation is ineffective, 
then strong evidence would be required to show that 
criminalization is likely to be efficacious. 
Even if there were no viable alternative to the use of 
coercion by the criminal law, the second neglected step is 
the leap from identification of a harmful phenomenon to its 
 
 104. See Jareborg, supra note 74. 
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attribution to a single perpetrator.  Even if the most 
serious claims for the harms of money laundering as a 
phenomenon are correct, the causal contribution of any 
given individual launderer to any of these macroeconomic 
effects will almost always be very small.  The economic 
argument is that the launderer makes a minuscule 
contribution to the risk that markets will operate below 
optimal efficiency.  Even if it is assumed that these threats 
are very grave, if a launderer is to be blamed, not so much 
for dealing with the profits of crime, but for increasing the 
probability of some economic and political catastrophe 
occurring, then the extent of the contribution of the 
launderer needs to be able to be quantified.  If the harm, 
which is being ascribed to the defendant for the purposes of 
the imposition of serious punishment is that of creating or 
increasing a risk of the occurrence of the consequences set 
out in the direst prediction of the effect of laundering, then, 
without some proof that the defendant actually did 
materially increase that danger, there is no harm and no 
basis for punishment. 
As to the problem of mens rea, there is again a 
problem.  Criminal law operates best, and is at its most 
morally justifiable, when the harm to avert which coercion 
is deployed is sufficiently closely related to the act which is 
required that nothing more is required than causing the 
harm intentionally.  Heavy punishment is much more 
difficult to justify when, as in the case of laundering, it is 
necessary to supply a further justification for the 
punishment.  In sentencing, courts should not need to have 
to add that the gravity of your conduct is increased 
because, in addition to helping someone benefit from crime, 
you behaved in a way that is very dangerous to the global 
economy.  It is difficult to justify increasing the 
punishment of any individual launderer on such a basis.  
Ultimately, the economic argument for the criminalization 
of money laundering does not satisfy because it fails to 
make out successfully the explicit claim that money 
laundering can be harmful to the global economy and does 
not begin to consider the implicit claim that persons who 
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create a threat to the global economy should be punished. 
V.  CONCLUDING 
Money laundering offenses have been put in place all 
over the globe.  This essay has maintained that the 
arguments which might be made for the instantiation of 
such an offense do not support it.  In the search for a 
coherent justifying account for the existence of a crime of 
money laundering, the essay has also considered the 
matters that might be relevant to sentence, according to 
which set of assumptions is taken to underpin the existence 
of the offense.  It has also considered the claims of the 
economic analysts that money laundering is a harmful 
phenomenon, and the relationship of those claims to 
criminalization of laundering.  The fact that crimes of 
laundering have been brought into force as part of a 
package of measures to deal with laundering means that 
they have escaped the scrutiny they deserve.  There are 
good grounds for the existence of some powers of 
confiscation of the proceeds of crime, but they do not imply 
that laundering should also be a crime.  We should beware 
of criminalization of remote harms,105 
overcriminalization,106 and the deployment of the criminal 
law in the economic sphere. 
Feinberg’s lasting contribution to the theory of 
criminal law was to revive and hone the liberal tradition of 
Beccaria and Mill and to require an individual and 
sufficient justification for each act of criminalization. This 
is important in the event of criminalization occurring at the 
insistence of international bodies whose policy-making fora 
are not transparent.  The criminalization of money 
laundering appears to have been added as a makeweight in 
international agreements for the provision of an 
 
 105. Andrew von Hirsch, Extending the Harm Principle: Remote Harms and 
Fair Imputation: Harm and Culpability 259 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 
1996). 
 106. Sandford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions 
in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 423 (1963). 
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international regulatory framework for confiscation of 
assets which are held as the product of crime.  The liberal 
tradition does not accept this kind of approach to be 
sufficient to justify the invocation of the criminal law.  I 
have the temerity to suggest that had The Moral Limits of 
the Criminal Law been published in 2001, it would have 
explained that there is no justification for an independent 
crime of laundering. 
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